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It’s Elementary
A Monthly Column by EFAP Director John Yinger
May 2014

The Impact of Education Finance Reform on Student Achievement in Massachusetts

In a recent article in the Journal of Education Finance, Phuong Nguyen-Hoang and I
investigate the impact of education finance reform on student achievement in Massachusetts. 1
Massachusetts is a good place to look for this type of impact because the state passed a
major education finance reform, the Massachusetts Education Reform Act (MERA), in June
1993. MERA created a new state education aid program, Chapter 70, with a new aid formula.
Moreover, both the level and the distribution of state aid across school districts changed
substantially over the next several years. To be specific, Chapter 70 aid more than doubled in real
terms between 1994 and 2010, and the aid formula gradually redistributed aid toward the
neediest districts. MERA was passed in response to a 1993 decision by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in the case of McDuffy v. Robertson. This decision found that the
existing education finance system was unconstitutional.
Almost all the school districts in Massachusetts are either regular or regional school
districts. Regular districts coincide with a municipality, whereas regional districts cover two or
more municipalities with a shared administration. Districts of both types vary in the grades they
cover, K-6, 6-12, or K-12. Massachusetts is also one of the few states in which almost all school
districts are fiscally dependent on a parent government. Voters in a district elect a school
committee, which is responsible for regulating student attendance, setting curricula, hiring and
firing teachers, and other administrative matters. However, municipal governments are
responsible for financing school services. Moreover, each municipal government is required to
provide, with the help of state aid, at least a minimum amount of local funding, which is
inversely related to its property values. Local school funding in Massachusetts comes largely
from the property tax. Thanks to Proposition 2 ½, which was passed in 1982, the property tax
rate and the property tax levy increase are both capped at 2 ½ percent, although a supermajority
of voters can override these provisions.
To determine the impact of MERA on student achievement, we estimated cost/efficiency
and demand models using data on school districts in Massachusetts from 2001 to 2006. This
column is not the place for a detailed description of these models or of our results. Suffice it to
say that these types of models are well known, have worked well in explaining education finance
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in other states, and work well in Massachusetts. 2
Our cost estimates indicate, for example, that a one-percentage-point increase in the share
of low-income students requires a 1.1 percent rise in the district’s per pupil spending to maintain
any given level of student performance. We also find evidence of economies to pupil scale;
except in the case of Boston, which is the state’s largest district, larger districts have lower costs
per pupil. 3
Our demand estimates imply that the income elasticity of demand for student
performance is 0.13, which is similar to estimates from other states. Moreover, we find that the
price elasticity of demand for student performance is -0.52, which indicates that in
Massachusetts, as in other states, voters demand better education in districts in which residential
property bears a smaller share of the tax burden. Overall, the dependent status of school districts
in Massachusetts does not appear to have a substantial impact on the translation of voter
demands into school outcomes.
Finally, we tackle the difficult issue of inefficiency, defined as spending beyond the
amount needed to reach a given performance standard using current best practices. As in other
states, for example, a higher residential share of taxes lowers inefficiency by motivating voters to
monitor their school officials more carefully. In contrast, an increase in state aid leads to more
inefficiency because it lowers voters’ perceived need for this type of monitoring.
We use these models to determine whether the substantial increases in Chapter 70 aid and
the changes in its distribution led to improved student performance, especially in high-need
school districts. Note that increased state aid does not necessarily lead to higher student
performance because it affects both the demand for education and the incentives of voters to
monitor school officials. We account for both types of effects.
These models then allow us to predict student performance in 2006 using (1) state
education aid per pupil in 1993 (the academic year just before MERA came into effect), (2) state
aid per pupil in 1993 blown up to the 2006 Chapter 70 aid total, and (3) actual Chapter 70 aid per
pupil in 2006. The first prediction indicates the student performance school districts would have
achieved in 2006 if they had received the amount of state education aid in 1993. The second
prediction indicates performance if the state had delivered the same amount of state aid as 2006
but with the 1993 distribution. The third predication shows the systematic impact on
performance of the implemented reforms. A comparison of (1) and (2) shows the impact of the
increase in the aid budget on student performance. A comparison of (2) and (3) shows the
analogous impact from changes in the aid formula. Finally, a comparison of (1) and (3) indicates
2
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the full impact of the MERA reforms.
We find that student performance, as measured by test scores, was boosted significantly
both by the increase in the aid budget and by the formula revisions that shifted aid toward highneed districts. As shown in Table 1 below, these positive impacts could be seen in both highneed and low-need districts. (In this table, a school district’s “need” is measured by its education
cost index, which is a product of our cost model estimation.) In short, increases in state education
aid can lead to higher student performance.
Nevertheless, this table also reveals how difficult it is to help the neediest districts: The
greater the need, the lower the impact of the reforms on student performance. Despite the fact
that revisions in the aid formula were designed to shift aid toward needier districts, for example,
these revisions led to a higher rise in the average low-need district (6.8 points) than in the
average high-need district (0.7 points). Even though MERA stimulated impressive student
performance gains, therefore, it actually increased the performance gap between the highest- and
lowest-need districts. More research is obviously needed to identify the state education aid
formulas (and, of course, other policies) that do the best job of helping the neediest districts.

Table 1. The Impacts of MERA on Test Scores by Cost Index Decile

Districts by cost index
deciles

Mean test
Mean test
scores with Mean test scores
scores with
boosted 1993 with actual
Differences
actual 1993
state
Chapter 70 aid
state education
education aid per pupil
aid per pupil
per pupila
(1)
(2)
(3)
(3) – (1) (3) – (2)
80.72
81.57
88.33
7.61
6.77
79.52
80.46
87.07
7.55
6.62
78.43
79.33
86.00
7.57
6.67
77.80
78.74
85.37
7.56
6.63
76.65
78.20
83.87
7.22
5.67
75.49
76.73
82.73
7.24
6.00
74.82
77.02
81.82
7.00
4.80
72.39
74.21
79.29
6.90
5.07
71.86
74.14
78.74
6.88
4.60
64.86
68.87
69.60
4.75
0.73

1-First (lowest)
2-Second
3-Third
4-Fourth
5-Fifth
6-Sixth
7-Seventh
8-Eighth
9-Ninth
10-Tenth (highest)
Difference between highest
and lowest deciles (in
15.87
12.69
percentage points)
Source: Table 6 in Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger (2014).

18.73

